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I propose to take Roberto Unger as seriously as he takes the questions he raises. One mark of his seriousness is his insistence on beginning
at the beginning, asking each question as if it had never been asked
before. As he puts it, with the combination of modesty and ambition
that makes his voice so distinctive, "[M]y purpose will be to think as
simply as I can about the problems I discuss. In our age, philosophy has
won some triumphs because a few men have managed to think with unusual simplicity." 1
Thinking simply about Unger, or trying to, means going back to his
early work in an effort to understand more fully those later writings that
have recently brought him public attention. I shall begin with Knowledge and Politics,2 with a view toward identifying a structure of concerns
that continues to underlie his more recent publications. For a while I
shall try, quite uncritically, to lay out "as simply as I can" the very complex argument of a difficult book.3 It is only when I turn to The Critical
Legal Studies Movement 4 (and I shall make no attempt to characterize
that movement, an effort that now constitutes a genre of its own) that I
shall introduce my reservations and criticisms. 5
My use of Milton is at once illustrative and polemical. In general
the legal academy, even that part of it that admires Unger, has been puzzled and discomforted by him. This discomfort reflects, I think, the uncongeniality of theological discourse to the legal mind, and in linking
Unger's thought to Milton's (with no suggestion of influence, although
t This Essay is a slightly revised reprint of Critical Legal Studies: Unger and Milton,
RARITAN, fall 1987, at 1, and CriticalLegal Studies (II): Roberto Unger's Transformative Politics,
RARrrAN, winter 1988, at 1. Copyright © 1987 and 1988 by Raritan, 165 College Ave., New
Brunswick, NJ 08903. The Duke Law Journal thanks the editors of Raritanfor their permission to
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influence is by no means impossible) I hope to provide a context in which
the nature and direction of his project becomes clear. At the same time I
6
am preparing the way for my most general conclusion about Unger,
which is that insofar as he is a religious thinker, concerned always to
inform the particular moments of everyday life with the imperatives of a
universal and Godly vision, he will never be able to fashion the politics
for which so many of his readers wait. (Speak, Unger.)
I
At a crucial moment in Areopagitica John Milton declares that
"[t]hey are not skilful considerers of human things who imagine to remove sin by removing the matter of sin."'7 Milton's point is that sin is
not a property of objects but of persons, and that therefore the elimination from the landscape of (supposedly) sinful objects will finally do
nothing to eliminate or even reduce a sin that lives within, a sin that
cannot be starved because it feeds on itself: "Though ye take from a
covetous man all his treasure, he has yet one jewel left-ye cannot bereave him of his covetousness." It follows then that no amount of external policing or surveillance will be of any effect, since the internal
condition of sinfulness will not have been touched and the sin will "remain entire": "Banish all objects of lust, shut up all youth into the severest discipline that can be exercised..., ye cannot make them chaste that
came not thither so ....
How then do you make them chaste? The answer, not surprisingly,
is by focusing on the true object of correction and reform, the inner constitution of the sinner, and by laboring to alter that constitution so that it
will "naturally" express itself in virtuous behavior. Such an alternation,
should it ever be achieved, will involve the exchanging of one compulsion
for another; where previously the individual, literally in the thrall of covetousness, was compelled to be covetous (covetousness was his essence),
now what compels him is whatever principle of desire (e.g., to be chaste)
lives in him as a constitutive force. The difference, then, is not between a
state of bondage (to sin) and a state of freedom, but between two differing
states of bondage; and in either state the possibilities for action will be
defined not by some set of external constraints (whose presence or absence will finally be irrelevant) but by those inner constraints of which
any action will be the involuntary expression. Milton's name for this
6. See infra notes 92-105, 159-68, and accompanying text.
7. J. MILTON, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 716, 733 (M. Hughes

ed. 1957).
8. Id.
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condition, in which the individual is at once free of external compulsions
and yet bound by the securest of ligaments, is "Christian Liberty," which
he defines in The ChristianDoctrine as "that whereby WE ARE LOOSED
10
... FROM THE RULE OF THE LAW AND OF MAN;"'
but he adds that to
be so loosed is not to be left free to do anything we like but to be given
over to the even stricter rules that now reside within us and, indeed, are
us:
So far from a less degree of perfection being exacted from Christians, it
is expected of them that they should be more perfect than those who
were under the law .... The only difference is, that Moses imposed
the letter, or external law, even on those who were not willing to receive it; whereas Christ writes the inward law of God by his Spirit on
the hearts of believers, and leads them as willing followers. 11
They will be willing followers not at this moment or at that moment
but at every moment, since there will be no distance or tension between
their own inclinations and the bidding of an internalized law. They will
not be in that divided state Milton satirizes in the person of the man who,
finding the demands of religion and morality too stringent, delegates to
some "factor" (hired agent) the "whole managing of his religious
affairs":
He entertains him, gives him gifts, feasts him, lodges him. His religion
comes home at night, prays, is liberally supped, and sumptuously laid
to sleep, rises, is saluted, .

. and better breakfasted than he whose

morning appetite would have gladly fed on green figs between Bethany
and Jerusalem, his religion walks abroad at eight, and leaves12 his kind
entertainer in the shop trading all day without his religion.
This sardonic portrait illustrates the consequences of conceiving of
law as an external check on individual desires; the law is experienced
only as an alien constraint, and it does not enter into a relationship with
those desires that might lead to their reformation. So long as law is a
matter of what someone else wants you to do, what you yourself want
will never be put into question. No genuine inner change occurs, merely
the superficial changes that result from the perpetual conflict between
public and personal wants. Moreover, the conditions of this conflict are
accepted as natural and inevitable, and the possibility of transforming
them-of bringing communal rule and individual desire together-is
never seriously entertained. The result is a general, if varied, complacency in which everyone is satisfied with the state of his own knowledge
and eager to impose that state on everyone else. The status quo is canon10. J. MILTON, The Christian Doctrine, in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE, supra note
7, at 903, 1012.
11. Id.
12. J.MILTON, supra note 7, at 740.
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ized, and the law becomes (ironically) the guardian of "received opinions" 3 in the name of a liberal tolerance, rather than a means of
transcending opinion and ascending to the realm of truth.
For Milton this stasis is the worst product of a law that fails to reach
the true source of error, not outward behavior but inward affections. It is
a loss, he says, "[m]ore than if some enemy at sea should stop up all our
havens and ports and creeks," for it "hinders and retards the importation
14
of our richest merchandise, truth," and operates to "settle falsehood."
As it turns out, falsehood is defined as anything that is settled, a definition that follows from Milton's thinking of truth not as a property of the
world, but as an orientation of being, an orientation that will never be
achieved if one remains confined within the partial and local perspectives
of custom and tradition. "Truth is compared in scripture to a streaming
fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetual progression, they sicken
into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition." 15 From this negative
definition (negative because it refuses, necessarily, to say what truth is)
comes Milton's positive program, "perpetual progression," keeping the
waters stirred up so that stagnation never can occur. In practice this
means a continual refusal to be satisfied with any currently persuasive
vision of what the truth is. The general rule is, distrust anything that
makes a general claim, that claims to be something more than a way
station along a road that is still to be traveled: "he who thinks we are to
pitch our tent here, and have attained the utmost prospect of reformation
that the mortal glass wherein we comtemplate can show us, till we come
to beatific vision, that man by this very opinion declares that he is yet far
16
short of truth."
The politics that emerges from this epistemology is (as every school
child once knew when Areopagitica was required reading) one of tolerance. Given that our visions are now clouded (now we see through a
glass darkly), "if it come to prohibiting, there is not aught more likely to
be prohibited than truth itself; whose first appearance to our eyes bleared
and dimmed with prejudice and custom, is more unsightly and unplausible than many errors."'17 It therefore behooves us to prohibit nothing, but to welcome each and every voice that together, if in different
tune, will form so many "brotherly dissimilitudes"' 81 and "neighboring
differences."' 19 It is statements like these that explain why Milton has
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 741.
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Id. at 739.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 748.
Id,at 744.
Id. at 747.
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been seen as an honored precursor of a democratic liberalism that centers
upon the values of free inquiry and freedom of expression. But in fact,
despite surface similarities, Milton's program is finally the antithesis of
that liberalism. The similarity, of course, is in the toleration of differences, but in liberal thought that toleration follows from the severing of
the realm of the political from the theological, an act that renders permanently unavailable the transcendent point of view theology assumes and
to which it aspires; consequently, all one can do is honor the points of
view held by individuals and make provisions through a political system
for their peaceful cohabitation. Difference, then, becomes the bottom
line, valued for its own sake and sanctified by being termed "individual
freedoms" and "individual rights."
Milton, however, counsels not the managing of difference but its
multiplication; and his aim is not to protect difference, in the sacred
name of individual rights, but finally to eliminate it. That is why his
insistence that we not pitch our tents here, on the campgrounds of any
orthodoxy, is qualified by a future hope: "till we come to beatific vision."' 20 Beatific vision names that state when all visions will be one and
indistinguishable from the vision of deity. Difference then is only a temporary and regrettable condition, but one, paradoxically, that we must
take advantage of if we are to transcend it. That is, since the glasses
through which we see are presently, but differently, dark, the danger represented by any one of them-the danger that it will be mistaken for the
glass of beatific vision-will be diminished to the degree that we are
aware of all the others. It is by encouraging perspectives to proliferate
that we minimize the risk of their settling into forms that limit our perception. In order to see further we must always be in the process of
unsettling and moving away from the ways of seeing that now offer themselves to us: "The light which we have gained, was given us, not to be
ever staring on, but by it to discover onward things more remote from
our knowledge. ' 21 The entire process is named by Milton "knowledge in
the making" 22 and the "constituting of human virtue," 2 3 and it will not
be completed, he acknowledges, until our "Master's second coming."' 24
Meanwhile we must be ever on guard against the danger of freezing
knowledge in its present form and making it into an idolatry; and our
vigilance must continuously produce "new positions," new perspectives,
which "were they but as the dust and cinders of our feet, . . . they may
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 741; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
J. MILTON, supra note 7, at 742.
Id. at 743.
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Id. at 742.
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yet serve to polish and brighten the armory of Truth."2 5

Readers of Roberto Unger's work will have recognized in the preceding paragraphs the argument of his Knowledge and Politics,26 a book
written in 1975 before the full emergence of the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, of which he is considered a major inspiration. The first half
of Knowledge and Politics27 is a critique of what Unger terms "the liberal
doctrine," a related set of premises that, he asserts, "took their classic
form in the seventeenth century."'28 Liberal doctrine comes into being
with the denial of "the existence of a chain of essences or essential qualities that we could either infer from particular things in the world or perceive face to face in their abstract forms."' 29 This denial creates the
"modem conception" 30 of the relationship between nature and perception, in which "[ilt is possible to divide the world in an indefinite number
of ways" but not possible to say that any of them "describes what the
world is really like."' 31 In the absence of a "master principle," 32 a transcendent point of view, we cannot "decide in the abstract whether a given
classification is justified," for the "only standard is whether the classifica'33 Indeed, it
tion serves the particular purpose we had when we made it."
is precisely the realm of the abstract, of a perspective not already captured by some partisan vision, that is eliminated in the liberal, secularized, all too human world, which now becomes a landscape of ever
proliferating particulars.
But even as modem man is committed by his denial of intelligible
essences to this landscape, he is also committed to escaping it, because
his practices depend for their justification on the abstract universality he
elsewhere denies. He believes at once that "there is no direct appeal to
reality, for reality is put together by the mind" and that "ultimately one
can make a rational choice among conflicting theories [constructs of the
mind] about the world." 34 These contradictory beliefs together form
what Unger calls the "antinomy of theory and fact," the irresolveable
conflict between two ideas to which modem man pledges allegiance:
25. Id. at 748.
26. R. UNGER, supra note 1.
27. See id. at 1-18, 29-144.

28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 32.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 31.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 32.

34. Id. at 33.
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"the mediation of all facts through theory and the possibility of an independent comparison of theory with fact." 35 Behind this antinomy
stands the "radical separation of form and substance, of the universal
and the particular, for that separation is the basis of the difference between general ideas..., which are formal and universal, and the under'36
standing.., of individual events, which is substantive and particular.
In our practices, both scientific and social, we seek and assume the availability of a justification for our particular judgments; but our general
conception of the human condition after the demise of intelligible essences-of unmediated knowledge-tells us that particular judgments
are all there are.
The psychological form of the antinomy of fact and value is the antinomy of reason (conceived of as a formal universal) and desire. In a
liberal world the individual is a bundle of appetites that are arbitrary "in
the sense that we cannot determine what to want"; that is, we cannot
"us[e] reason to justify their content."' 37 The reason is that reason does
not have desires; that's what makes it reason. Reason can point out
desires, describe them, but the moment it acts to prefer one desire to
another, it has become a desire itself, and is no longer reason, no longer
formal and universal. Conversely, desires have no reasons except for the
reasons they imply, which are not reasons at all since they spring from
desires and cannot legitimately be cited in support of them. Were desire
truly to submit itself to reason it would become absorbed by reason and
cease to be itself. Reason cannot take serious note of desire without compromising itself; desire cannot defer to reason without denying itself.
Desires cannot be the objects of rational choice because choice is the
antithesis of desire, but rational choice is nevertheless honored as the
only basis of a civilized society, of a society in which desires do not go
unchecked. (Of course, in argument and council desires are often urged
in the context of "reasons," and one does reject certain courses of desirable action by saying that they are wrong; "[b]ut the reason for this is that
whenever we act we always have a host of goals other than the one to
which the activity of the moment is directed, and we do not allow all our
'38
ends to be sacrificed to the achievement of an immediate objective.
That is, the preferring of one desire to another follows from a calculation
of desire, of what we want more: "the priorities among conflicting ends
must be settled by the will."' 39)
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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Liberal politics mediates (and mimes) the antinomy of reason and
desire-an antinomy that is the very structure of the liberal self-by dichotomizing human behavior into two opposed and ultimately irreconcilable realms, the public and the private:
Since men are made up of the two different elements of reason and will,
they move in two worlds only precariously bound together. When reasoning, they belong to a public world because knowledge, to the extent
it is true, does not vary among persons. When desiring, however, men
are private beings because they can never offer others more than a partial [i.e. partisan] justification for their goals ....
40
Obviously this division merely reproduces in the larger society the split
that is constitutive of liberal consciousness, leaving two spheres that
show blind faces to one another: in the public sphere desires go unacknowledged (that, at least, is the fiction) except as forces that must be
contained, and in the private sphere desires reign uncurbed and a man
can do as he likes, trading in the shop of his appetites like Milton's "enlightened" modem, free from the pressure of general censure and constraint. One sphere "assert[s] the priority of the good [the content of
desire] over the right"; the other "the priority of the right [of the impersonally just and true] over the good."' 41 Pleasure on the one hand, and
principle on the other, triumph in their separate compartments, and
human life is forever disunified.
Moreover, any effort at unity is doomed to failure, because "no synthesis of the two seems possible within liberal psychology." 42 This is so
because the demands of the two realms do not allow them to interact or
cooperate. Cooperation would require, at the very least, recognition of
the one by the other. But since desire is arbitrary, and springs from personal appetite, it can only recognize the dictates and strictures of reasons
as the expressions of someone else's desire, and it will reject them as
illegitimate impositions. And since reason is by definition neutral-not
oriented in this direction or the other-it can only note the existence of
desires as items in a purely formal world; it cannot recognize them for
what they are, and therefore it cannot say anything about them. To put
it another way, the only imperative that reason might direct at desire is
"be reasonable," but since reason is by definition "neutral toward the
purposes [desires] of specific individuals," 4 3 the imperative can never
make contact with its object; for there to be contact, the "golden rule" of
reasonableness would have to be more than an "empty shell," would
40. Id. at 45.
41. Id. at 51.
42. Id.

43. Id. at 53.
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have to be "filled up" by something "concrete," that is, particular; 44 but
once that happens, reason is no longer neutral but is all mixed up in the
world of purposes from which it must keep its defining distance.
The antinomy of reason and desire is therefore ineradicable, and
it is a fate that falls with terrible force upon those whose moral experience the principles of liberal psychology describe. Its mark on everyday life is the unacceptability, indeed the incomprehensibility, of the
two halves of the self to each other. For reason, when it sets itself up
as moral judge, the appetites are blind forces of nature at loose within
the self. They must be controlled and if necessary suppressed. For the
will, the moral commands of reason are despotic laws that sacrifice life
45
to duty. Each part of the self is condemned to war against the other.
This war plays itself out in the alternate claims of the public and private
fives. "Public organization strikes the private [desiring] self as a preordained fact in whose making it had no part. Private interest... has,
for the public [reasoning] self, the appearance of enslavement to blind
instinct and ambition."'4 6 "Thrown back and forth between [the] two,"
the self "cannot accept either as a resting place." 47 The result is a politics that has exactly the form Milton critiques in the Areopagitica:48 an
external constraint (public morality and law) asserts itself against an inward orientation that can only perceive it as threat and coercion and
therefore cannot respond in any constructive-i.e., self-reflective-way
to its pressures. Consequently, the whole of life becomes an endless succession of momentary adjustments of two contending forces-an unjustified law and an unjustifiable desire-to one another. The best that
government can do (and indeed this becomes the stated goal of liberal
politics) is to guarantee, or claim to guarantee, a minimal level of formal
procedure-of due process-so as to allow contending desires equal access to the battlefield on which they must endlessly fight. In this dreary
landscape the face of things is continually changing, but genuine change
of the kind that would provide desire with a justification outside of itself,
and reason with a content that was not merely formal and therefore
empty, seems forever unavailable.
The great desideratum, then, is to find a way out of the liberal antinomies of fact/value, reason/desire, public/private, to bring together in
fruitful cooperation the two halves of a sterile and stagnating antagonism. The second half of Knowledge and Politics is concerned to set us
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 60.
Id.
See supra notes 7-25 and accompanying text.
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on that way,49 but it begins by first considering and then dismissing one
facilely attractive route:
One way to solve the problem of the universal and the particular, and
thus the antinomies of liberal thought, would be simply to deny its
terms. Instead of assuming the separation of the universal and the particular, we would start off from the premise of their identity. Thus, in
a single move, we might stand liberal thought on its head in the hope
of escaping from its internal contradictions. 50
The trouble with this "single move," this version of Hamlet's "thinking
makes it so,'' 5 1 is that it ignores the important truth the liberal antinomies tell us about our present condition, its distance from the more ideal
condition in which the internal contradictions of liberal thought would
not be felt. One does not bring about the union of reason and desire
simply by declaring them to be unified; all such declaration accomplishes
is the weakening of any impulse to critical analysis and reform, since, if
reason and desire are already one, all impulses "have become by definition the good" 52 and there is no longer any bite to the "notion that the
53
world might [now] be different from what we think it ought to be."1
Consequently, we fall into "the sanctification of actuality," 5 4 forgetting
that our goal should be "the transformation of society."' 55 The problematic of the universal and the particular cannot be theorized out of existence; it must be grasped in a way that both acknowledges the
inadequacies of which it is the formulation and refuses to acquiesce in
those inadequacies as a liberal politics- concerned to protect difference,
but without any vision of its transcendence-will always do. "We need a
way to make the universal and the particular at once the same and
56
different."
That way is found in a recharacterization of the universal and the
particular in which the former is expressed by the latter, but never limited by it. That is, the universal is not an empty formal structure, but
something that "always exists in a concrete way"; but that concrete way
does not exhaust the meaning of the universal "or its possible modes of
existence." 57 It thus becomes possible to say that the universal and the
particular are at once the same and different. They are the same in that
one could not have a form independently of the other; the universal needs
49. See R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 18-24, 137-295.
50. Id. at 137, 139.
51. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act II, sc. ii, 1. 250 (H. Jenkins ed. 1982).

52. R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 140.
53. Id. at 139.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 141.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 143,
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particulars into which to flow, and the particulars acquire their meaning
and significance as instantiations of the universal. They are different because the universal is always more than any one of its instantiations,
more even than their sum. Indeed, under this conception, the universal
is not fixed, but is "the open set of concrete and substantive determinasS Because the
tions in which it can appear."58
set is open, that is, because
history brings with it more and more opportunities for concrete determination, the universal is always being changed by each new partial expression of it. The ideal and the actual do not exist in opposition to one
another, nor are they merely names for the same static thing; rather they
emerge together as a set of possibilities that is always finding a manifestation of itself that it is at the same time always exceeding.
Unger declares that human nature is itself such an open set, a universal filled out by the actions of particular individuals, but never wholly
captured in those actions:
[H]uman nature is neither an ideal identity that subsists in its own
right [as a purely formal structure] nor a mere collection of persons
and cultures [just a name for what already is]. Instead, it is a universal
that exists through its particular embodiments, always moves beyond
any one of them, and changes through their sequence. Each person
and each form of social life represents a novel interpretation of humanity, and each new interpretation transforms what humanity is.5 9
What this means is that the nature of human nature is not settled but is
always in the process of emerging as persons relate to the world in ways
that define both the world and themselves as bearers of human possibility. In the absence of a fixed human nature, of a formal universal, the
substantive universal that is human nature is always up for grabs. "[A]ll
choices," declares Unger, "imply a decision about the kind of person one
wants to be" 60 and therefore a decision about the emerging and changing
shape of human nature. "Humanity consists in a continuous predicament and in the kinds of relations to nature, to others, and themselves
with which persons respond to that predicament ....
In social terms the predicament is experienced as the tension between the integrity of the individual and the demands of community.
(Duncan Kennedy, one of the leading proponents of Critical Legal Studies, calls this the "fundamental contradiction." 62) The individual can
only know himself in his relations with others, but insofar as he is defined
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See
13 (1979).

at 195.
at 204.
at 246.
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFFALO L. REv. 205, 211-
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by those relations, he is in danger of losing his individuality (obviously
this is the liberal antinomy all over again):
To be an individual one must win the recognition of others. But the
greater the conformity to their expectations, the less is one a distinctive
individual .... The self is individual and it is social. But the requirements of individuality are in conflict with the demands of sociability
in
63
a way that does not seem immediately capable of solution.
That is where liberal thought stops and resigns itself to keeping minimal
order, but transformative thought chooses to see this dilemma as an opportunity, "as a circumstance in which others are complementary rather
than opposing wills in the sense that to join with them in a community of
understandings and purposes increases rather than diminishes one's own
individuality. '"64 Rather than seeing the other as a representative of a
competing vision of what human nature should be, transformative
thought sees the other as one of the many instantiations or interpretations of human nature that are necessary to its full emergence. Difference no longer marks conflict between irreconcilable individual wills, but
marks rather the various but not opposing paths individual wills follow
in their pursuit of a single goal. (The apt comparison is to Milton's
"brotherly dissimilitudes. 6 5s ) One therefore welcomes, indeed prizes,
perspectives other than one's own as contributions to the end for which
everyone works, the end that defines and gives shape to everyone's labors, labors that are therefore at once different and the same.
The model for this generosity toward others that returns as a credit
and addition to the self is, not surprisingly, the Christian practice of loving one's neighbor as oneself and for the sake of the God who made both:
To the religious man, every other person is a particular manifestation
of the universal substance in which the soul, including his own soul,
consists, and this universal substance is inseparable from its particular
embodiments. Such a man cannot prize
God or himself without priz66
ing others as the individuals they are.
Such a man is at once partial and many-sided. He is partial because
he is situated in a particular historical position; but he is many-sided
because he views his actions in that position as in concert with the actions of others whose different situation gives them a vantage point he
cannot directly enjoy. The more he is able to see his efforts in this wayas one form of the human nature everyone is trying to express and construct-the larger they are, despite their partiality, for even as they are
made, they will be made both for him and for the sake of those others
63.
64.
65.
66.

R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 217.
Id.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 218.
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with whom he is a co-striver; and at some point the exertions of such a
man will "have become a gift to the entire species," 67 a gift that is returned to him in the form of an enlargement of the self that he has been
willing to lend to a common project.
The presence in the world of such an enlarged and enlarging self is
contagious: he "cannot rest, or play, or even dream in peace until he has
awakened his fellows from their slumber as he was awakened by
others."'68 The slumber is the slumber of partiality as a prison forever
separated from the universal; the awakening is to partiality as a participation in and fashioning of the universal. As more and more awakened
selves see themselves in this way and act accordingly (differently but in
the same spirit), the sense of shared purpose existing through a diversity
of practices will result in the emergence of a "community of sympathy,"' 69 a community marked by "conditions of diminishing domination,"'70 for each will see every other as affirming his own nature;
furtherance of the others' ends "would mean the advancement of one's
own," and "[t]he conflict between the demands of individuality and of
sociability would disappear. ' 71 At that moment, all the other antinomies
that fracture liberal thought will disappear too. Reason will be one with
desire, because what the individual wants-to be more and more expressive of the essence of human nature-will also be the rule or norm
against which he measures himself, and, of course, finds himself still
wanting (pun decidedly intended). Fact will be one with value because
every thing and action in the world will be seen and engaged as a manifestation of a controlling aspiration. Public will not be distinguished
from private, because the act of the individual will simultaneously be his
own and belong to the community that the act is even now building. The
realm of the extraordinary-of those moments in which one grasps the
disparity between what man is and what he could be-will pass over into
the realm of the everyday. Indeed, there will no longer be any distinction
between them, as the awakened man sees "the task he has set himself...
before his eyes at every moment and in every circumstance. ' 72 It is to
that task that Unger calls us in remarkably affecting terms, inviting us to
be among those "who are able first to anticipate, then to recognize, but

67. Id. at 224.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 220-22, 224-26.

70. Id. at 225.
71. Id. at 220.
72. Id. at 224-25.
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finally to embrace perfect being in imperfect, and fugitive, earthly
form."73

This last sentence, which has the ring of a conclusion, ends Unger's
fifth chapter, but there is a sixth chapter, and it draws us back from the
glorious promise of the sentence by reminding us of what stands between
us and the embracing of perfect being. First there are the dangers that
are the several faces of liberal politics: resignation, utopianism, and idolatry. Resignation is "acquiescence in pure partiality and the abandonment of the universal part of the self as a hopeless dream. The person is
completely absorbed in his concrete social position and identified with
'74 The same person may
it."
come to recognize the universal part of himself, but see no connection between it and the necessarily partial nature of
his everyday life. He will have fallen prey to utopianism, "the tendency
to define the good in such a manner that it cannot be related to the historical situation in which one finds oneself."'T" Or alternatively he may
see all too close a connection between the historical situation in which he
finds himself and the realization of the universal; he may think that the
universal is already fully actualized in the forms his behavior routinely
takes. Like Milton's journeyer, who pitches his tents "here" in the conviction that he has no further to go, 7 6 he will then be committing idolatry, "mistaking the present situation ...for the accomplishment of the

ideal"; 77 he will accept the imperfect as the perfect and remain forever a
prisoner of the social and political structures that mirror his
complacency.
Although they are distinguishable, resignation, utopianism, and
idolatry all have the same effect: they inhibit change and reaffirm the
status quo. The resigned man sees no alternative to the imperatives of his
own social and political situation, and he devotes himself wholly to those
imperatives. The utopian man sees that there exists a mode of being
more full and satisfactory than that which he now knows, but believes
that his vision of the ideal is wholly discontinuous with the present state
of things and that he "has no choice but to worship established power as
a mystery [he] cannot grasp and as a fact [he] cannot change."78 And the
idolater, having mistaken "[tihe existing consensus ...for the final ex73. Id. at 235.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 223.
Id. at 237.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 236.

78. Id. at 237.
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pression of the good,"' 79 will naturally regard dissent as evil and change
as corruption, and will fall easily into a conservative politics that "is al'80
ways on the verge of becoming oppression.
Against these dangers Unger poses a politics that is the direct descendent of Milton's, a politics of perpetual distrust and perpetual progression, a politics that "emphasizes the transitory and limited character
of all forms of group life as manifestations of human nature." 8 1 Such a
politics "will be committed to the plurality and diversity of groups, and it
will prize the conflictual process through which community is created
'8 2 It
and made universal above the preservation of any one collectivity."
will neither reaffirm the status quo by idealizing it nor celebrate change
and disruption for their own sake; rather, it will utilize change and disruption as necessary mechanisms for the continuing of the journey toward a stability that would represent the domination of no one because it
would mark the triumph and the emergence into full being of everyone.
Merely to rehearse the promise of such a politics, however, is to
raise the question Unger is now obliged to answer, and indeed it is the
question with which he opens this final chapter: "How can the ideal be
realized in everyday life?8 3 In fact, he has already provided the answer:
"one must turn to politics. Only politics can make the ideal concrete,
concrete in everyday life. .... -84 But that answer only provokes another
question or series of questions. What exactly is the politics that can do
this? How does it start? Where does it start? One obvious place to start
is the enlargement of democracy, "the progressive replacement of meritocratic by democratic power in the ordinary institutions of society," so
that "[d]ecisions about what to produce . . . , for which objectives to
produce, and how to produce are increasingly defined as political and...
collective." 85 Thus, public life would be more and more contiguous with
Iprivate life, as every aspect of daily existence would become a matter of
the political choices of fully enfranchised agents in a "democracy of
ends."' 86 But the questions persist, and again it is Unger who raises them.
While the "adoption of the democracy of ends describes a process of
[ever-enlarging] choice,.. . it does not establish the standards by which
individuals engaged in that process ought to choose."' 87 Moreover, any
79. Id. at 266-67.
80. Id. at 266.
81. Id. at 267.
82. Id.
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attempt to formulate such a standard would be disastrous to the entire
enterprise since it "could not lay down... principles of choice without
... lending a spurious authority to the beliefs and practices of a particular society or age."88 It would seem then that there is a tension between
the desire that the individual be fully enfranchised to make choices, and
the necessity of some larger or communal sense of purpose whose invocation would ensure that the choices made were progressive and cumulative rather than merely ad hoc. Moreover, as Unger is quick to point
out, this tension, discovered at the heart of the democratic ideal to which
the entire book has been pointing, "is another aspect of that same conflict
between particularism and univeralism encountered before."8 19 That conflict, rather than having been transcended by the notion of a community
of ever-enlarging sympathies, is found to inhabit that notion, and, as
Milton would have put it, to be there "writ large." Even as politics is
proclaimed as the answer to the question-"[h]ow can the ideal be realized in everyday life?" 9 0-the answer is revealed as fatally flawed, and
Unger is forced to acknowledge, late in the game, that the "limits of
politics are another side of the imperfection of all our efforts to achieve
the good and to represent it in a form of social life." 91
As Knowledge and Politics draws to its close, the admissions of failure proliferate:
[T]he gap between the universal and the
partial aspect of personality is
92
never directly or completely bridged.
93
... [T]he ideal can never fully be achieved in history.

The ideal of universal community, like the ideal of the self from
which it derives, is . . . incapable of being completely realized in
94
history.
S '. [O]nly a person could 95
fully realize the ideal and . . . this
person cannot be man in history.
Who then could it be? The answer is at once surprising and inevitable, and it is the title of the book's last section, "God": 9 6 "The idea of a
union of immanence and transcendence or of a universal being who
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 236; see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
91. R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 274.
92. Id. at 226.

93. Id. at 233.
94. Id. at 260.
95. Id. at 293.
96. Id. at 290.
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knows and determines all particulars without destroying their particularity is the idea of God."' 97 It is knowledge of God and his perfection that
will serve as a "regulative ideal" 98 in relation to which the inadequacies
of the present order of things can be measured and transcended. God, at
once universal and the informing spirit of every particular, is the model
of the true community of sympathy. "So completely does He solve the
problem of the abstract and the concrete self that He is eternally everything He might or should be." 99
Here at last then is the solution to every problem and the dissolution
of all antinomies, but even as it is offered, it is withdrawn, for it is a
resolution that we are incapable of achieving:
The existence of God and the salvation of men are ideas whose truth
could only be shown, if they could be shown at all, by God through
His direct revelation of Himself in history. As a person who stands
above the world and apart from thought, He cannot be known except
to the extent that He makes Himself present to us .... It is He who
must reveal his immanent being, and we who must pray to Him for its
showing. 10°
And it is in prayer that the book ends, asking for the revelation that will
redeem its failure: "But our days pass, and still we do not know you
fully. Why then do you remain silent? Speak, God." 10 1
There is more than a little frustration in this plea, and it has been
echoed by Unger's readers in the legal community, many of whom feel
disappointed and even cheated by a book that advertises (if only in its
title) a political agenda, but delivers a lesson that undermines politics by
leaving us in the supine posture of supplication. What the book doesn't
provide is a plan, a set of procedures whose self-conscious implementation would result in the building of the community Unger so powerfully
describes. Instead it leaves us with a renewed sense of the rootedness of
the liberal antinomies and with a way of retroactively reading the first
half of the book as a religious allegory. The disappearance of intelligible
essences, rather than marking a mere shift in philosophical perspective,
marks a withdrawal from the world of God, a withdrawal that occurs at
the Fall, separating us forever from a truth we continuously but vainly
seek. The words are Milton's: "Truth indeed came once into the world
with her divine Master, and was a perfect shape most glorious to look on.
But when he ascended,... then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers,
who... took the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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Those few who wish to restore Truth's lovely form go constantly
"up and down gathering up limb by limb" as they can find them.10 3 "We
have not yet found them all," says Milton, allowing us for a moment the
prospect of a task almost complete, a task within our abilities to accomplish; but then he takes that prospect away with these chilling words:
"nor ever shall do, till her Master's second coming. He shall bring together every joint and member.... ."04 It is the movement, in small, of
the whole of Knowledge and Politics, the indictment of fallen history as
the state of being separate from God-of partiality and difference unredeemed by a universal and universalizing vision-followed by a declaration that union with God, the reconciliation of individual actions with
divine purpose, is something only He can initiate and achieve. Just as
Milton's "nor ever shall do" is a rebuke to the facile hopes of a reader
who expects to be exhorted to specific (and efficacious) acts, so is the
entire second half of Knowledge and Politics a rebuke to the hopes that
Unger has raised (and entertained) of a political remedy for the infirmities that attend fallen consciousness. The final lesson of Knowledge and
Politics-a lesson that makes a joke of its title-is that redemption is
theological, not political, that the union of reason and desire, fact and
value, universal and particular, can only be realized in a union with deity
in a process of which He must be simultaneously the goal and the way.
1 05
"I am the way, the truth and the life."
II
It is a lesson the modern intellectual is ill equipped to hear and unlikely to applaud, and Unger seems to feel its inadequancy as much as
0 6 to
anyone. In effect he writes The Critical Legal Studies Movement
redeem the failed promise of the first half of Knowledge and Politics, by
offering an "engineering" version of his theological vision. By "engineering" I mean that, rather than beginning with transcendence or requiring
its intervention, he builds toward transcendence by identifying some
route that is accessible to man in his present condition, by identifying a
genuine politics. This is what Unger promises in his first paragraph
when he says that the Critical Legal Studies Movement "implies a view
of society and informs a practice of politics. '10 7 This is not the practice
102. J. MILTON, supra note 7, at 741-42.

103. Id. at 742.
104. Id.
105. John 14:6.
106. Unger, supra note 4, at 561.

107. Id. at 563.

Vol. 1988:975]

UNGER AND MILTON

of politics as one usually finds it in the dominant legal culture. That
practice, which will be the sustained object of Unger's critique, is characterized (as is liberalism in general) by "a belief in the possibility of[ ] a
method of legal justification that can be clearly contrasted to open-ended
disputes about the basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, or visionary." 10 8 This belief cannot survive
"[h]istorical study," which has "repeatedly shown that every attempt to
find the universal legal language.., revealed the falsehood of the original
idea."' 0 9 That is to say, whatever has been offered as an alternative to
open-ended dispute between interested actors has upon investigation
been revealed to be an extension of some interest that is not acknowledging itself, not even to itself. There can finally be no contrast "between
the more determinate rationality of legal analysis and the less determinate rationality of ideological contests."' 10 Everything is ideological contest even if some ideologies succeed in masquerading as the "universal
legal language."
Any such masquerade succeeds only by suppressing the conflict that
would ensue if its own ground were contested. In order to avoid that
contest the reigning (and always illegitimate) orthodoxy must devise
ways to account for and accommodate pressures and problems that seem
to challenge its hegemony. But as the challenges multiply the efforts to
contain them become more frantic. The doctrine that was offered as "a
canonical form of social life . . . that could never be fundamentally
remade" ' ' begins to crack under the strain; as the supposedly bedrock
notions are stretched and redefined under the pressure of increasingly
powerful counterexamples, "the initial conception of a natural form of
society becomes weaker: the categories more abstract and indeterminate,
the champions more acutely aware of the contentious character of their
own claims." 112 And yet they hold on tenaciously, most probably, Unger
speculates, in the fear that the abandoning of the claim to generality
"would leave nothing standing. The very possibility of legal doctrine,
and perhaps even of normative argument generally, might be destroyed." 113 The result is a situation in which lip service is paid to a
putatively "defensible scheme of human assocation"" l4 at the same time
that "an endless series of ad hoc adjustments"' " 5 empties that scheme of
108. Id. at 564.
109. Id at 568.
110. Id. at 565.

111. IdL at 576.
112.
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114.
115.
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its pretensions to integrity. "It is always possible to find ... radically
inconsistent clues about the range of application of each of the models
and indeed about the identity of the models themselves."'1 16 The claim is
to be applying general truths to particular contexts, but in fact the socalled general truths increasingly "fall hostage to context-specific calculations of effect," 1 7 "ad hoc qualifications" ' 1 8 of principles that leave the
principles with no content. It is the worst of all possible worlds: a frozen
and empty doctrine held in place by a "collection of makeshift apologies" 11 9 that mask a conflict that has no direction because it is never
acknowledged. The prevailing orthodoxy threatens us with the choice
between it and "the inconclusive contest of political visions"; "either resign yourself to some established version of social order, or face the war
of all against all."' 2 0 But so long as the established version of the order
maintains itself by ignoring contest or by adapting shamelessly to contest's every changing shape, the war of all against all is what we really
have.
False universals and the war of untransformed particulars-this is
what orthodox legal liberal thought offers and where the first two sections of Unger's essay leave us. In section III, entitled "From Critique to
Construction,"' 121 Unger begins to unfold the positive program that will
produce true universals in the form of transformed particulars. That
program will be given many names in the course of the essay, and here,
in the first few paragraphs of its introduction, it is called "enlarged doctrine," "expanded doctrine," and "deviationist doctrine." 122 By any
name, it seeks to open up "the petrified relations between abstract ideals
or categories, like freedom of contract or political equality, and the le23
gally regulated social practices that are supposed to exemplify them."'
Only the "casual dogmatism of legal analysis" prevents us from seeing
that these abstractions "can receive ... alternative institutional embodiments"' 24 and that therefore the present arrangement of things is neither
necessary nor even, when examined critically, plausible. It is just such a
critical examination, informed by a general suspicion of the apparently
authoritative, that is required; rather than acquiescing in the papering
over of the cracks and fissures in the official account of legal doctrine,
116. Id.

117. Id. at 566.
118. Id. at 569.
119. Id. at 573.
120. Id.
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deviationist doctrine seeks to exaggerate them-"to recognize and develop the disharmonies of the law"1 25-in order to open a window on the
"indefinite possibilities of human connection," the many "alternative
schemes of human association." 126 The more this is done, the less any
one of those schemes will be able to entrench itself, and the larger will be
the area of contest, the area in which basic questions about the structure
of social life are raised and debated. "In this way no part of the social
world can be secluded from destabilizing struggle."' 127 "[T]he practice of
expanded doctrine begins all over again the fight over the terms of social
life."1 28
Obviously, this is the argument of Knowledge and Politics all over
again: in a world of contesting schemes of human association, none of
which has the status of a universal, we must guard against the danger of
acquiescing to the claims of any one of them; and we can best do this by
exaggerating rather than sublimating their differences, keeping before us
the goal of achieving and becoming the universal to which their inadequacies (if only negatively) point. That is, we must prize "the conflictual
process through which community is created and made universal above
the preservation of any one collectivity."1 29 In Knowledge and Politics
this general statement of a program is unredeemed because we are never
told how to move from the prizing of conflict as a cautionary strategy to
the utilization of conflict as a way to create the universal. That is, prizing the conflictual process does not lead necessarily to a transcendence of
conflict; rather it would seem to lead to more of the same, to the intensification of the war of all against all. What is required is some principle or
lever that will enable us to grasp a foregrounded conflictual process and
turn it in a positive direction. What is required is what in Knowledge and
Politics could only be supplied by God, a starting point. (The naming of
God as the starting point short-circuits the development of a politics
since it takes agency away from man.) The CriticalLegal Studies Movement should be understood precisely as an effort to supply that starting
point; it will be my contention that the effort repeatedly fails and that
Unger only escapes the war of all against all by once again invoking (if
only implicitly) the theological intervention that marked his earlier
30
failure.1
125. Id.
126. Id. at 579.
127. Id. at 584.

128. Id. at 583.
129. R.

UNGER,

supra note 1, at 267; see supra note 82 and accompanying text.

130. See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text; supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:975

He begins briskly, with a concise and straightforward outline of a
program:
You start from the conflicts between the available ideals of social life in
your own social world or legal tradition and their flawed actualizations
in present society. You imagine the actualizations transformed, or you
transform them in fact, perhaps only by extending an ideal to some
area of social life from which it had previously been excluded. Then
emyou revise the ideal conceptions in the light of their new practical
13 1
bodiments. You might call this process internal development.
Calling this process internal development is no casual gesture. The
strong claim is in the word "internal," which suggests that the process
generates its own direction. All you need to begin with is the awareness
the foregrounding of the conflictual process will have given you, the
awareness that the competing ideals of social life do not receive support
from the practices we routinely engage in, or, what amounts to the same
thing, that those same practices could be understood (by someone sufficiently skilled at rationalization) as supporting any number of ideals. At
this point you will have recognized the inadequacy both of the present
state of things and of the currently available visions in the name of which
that state has been justified.
So far, so good. Then comes the crucial step. "You imagine the
actualizations [the present state of things] transformed." But how do
you do that? Or more precisely, from where do you do that? Obviously,
given Unger's double thesis of the (present) unavailability of a general
perspective and the flawed nature of the perspectives we now inhabit, the
only position we could possibly occupy is the position of one of those
flawed perspectives; and consequently any transformation would have to
be imagined from the vantage point of that perspective, as an extension
(even as it was a modification) of its partiality. "Transformation" is perhaps too grand a word for this process, which might be better called
"change," understood as the passage from one limited (partisan) vision
to another with no sense that during the passage the state of being limited will in any way have been relaxed. In short, while I am not denying
that something of the sort Unger describes does in fact occur-we do
revise our practices in the light of a felt inadequacy-its occurrence will
not mean the loosening of limits because the light that provoked it will
itself be equally, if differently, limited.
Of course, for the person who has performed the act of revision, the
resulting practice will seem larger, more capacious than the practice he
has left behind; but this capaciousness will be evident and palpable only
from within the perspective that now becomes his horizon. For another
131. Unger, supra note 4, at 579-80.
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person the new practice will seem not larger at all, but have the aspect of
a restriction on the human capacity for growth and self-realization. In
the eyes of some, Roe v. Wade132 represents an extension of the ideal of
individual rights (in the form of the right to privacy) "to some area of
social life from which it had previously been excluded"; but in the eyes of
others the same decision represents a disastrous violation of the same
ideal, a setback to the efforts of society to enhance the lives of-its members. Moreover, this is a difference of opinion that cannot be adjudicated
by some third party, since the perspective from which that party would
speak would be no less limited than the perspectives it presumed to
judge. Without a mechanism for determining whether a proposed or
imagined revision would constitute a step forward rather than a step
backward on the journey to a truly transformed society, that journey can
never begin, for no claimed beginning would have the authority it would
need in order to serve as the uncontroversial basis for the next step. In
such a world (the world Unger everywhere acknowledges we live in), the
area of conflict can never be enlarged (as his doctrine requires); it can
only be reconfigured. And the reason it cannot be enlarged is that the
area exempt from conflict, the area bounded by the presently settled convictions of the agent, will always be the same size-the exact size of the
agent's necessarily unexamined assumptions-even though its shape and
its relationship to the (mutually constitutive) area of the unsettled will
change. No matter how often that change occurs, the result will always
be a perceiving consciousness for whom some things (facts, theorems,
judgments, etc.) are undoubted and undoubtable, while others remain a
matter of dispute; the members of the two categories will vary, but the
structural relationship between them will not, and it will never be possible absolutely to diminish the one in the service of the other.
Unger in effect acknowledges as much when he says of the project of
"internal development" or "enlarged doctrine" that its "weakness ...is
obviously its dependence upon the starting points provided by a particular tradition;"' 133 that is, the to-be-transformed consciousness begins its
task of bootstrapping its way to transcendence while still firmly embedded within a particular, limited point of view. He thinks, however, that
this weakness can be overcome with the help of a recent shift in our
understanding of our epistemological condition. "[T]o an unprecedented
extent," he reports, we now understand "society ... to be made and
imagined rather than merely given."' 3 4 What he is referring to, of course,
is the emergence in a number of disciplines of an antifoundationalist epis132. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
133. Unger, supra note 4, at 580.
134. Id. at 579.
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temology in which both the facts and structures of our social world
(along with the possibilities for action that world is thought to contain)
are seen not as naturally or divinely ordained but as the accomplishments
of interested, situated agents like you and me. Unger's reasoning is that
since more and more people have been persuaded to this view of things
and therefore know that whatever they take to be certain and unalterable
is in fact so only within a contingent and revisable construction of the
world, those same people should now be "naturally" inclined to regard
with suspicion and skepticism any received system of ideas including (indeed especially) their own. In other words, the hold a "particular tradition" and its "starting point" may have on us will be loosened to the
extent that we have become aware of its status as a revisable construction. All we need to do is begin with the assumption (identified by Unger
as "crucial" 1 35) that "no one scheme of association has conclusive authority,"1 36 using that insight as a "starting point" with which to counter
and critique the starting point of our received traditions.
The trouble is that as a starting point, the insight that no one
scheme of human association has conclusive authority is empty; as a universal statement all it tells you about a particular scheme of association is
that it is not the whole story. But it can't, in the absence of the whole
story, tell you in what way the scheme is deficient; and therefore it can't
tell you in what direction to move away from a scheme that has been the
object of a general indictment. If that scheme is one to which you are
committed-in the strong sense of proceeding within its assumptions and
categories of understanding-the knowledge that it too must be included
in that indictment will not even touch it, first because "it" is not something graspable by a critical consciousness (it is, after all, constitutive of
consciousness), and second because its partiality is known at so abstract a
level that there can be no bridge between that knowledge and anything in
particular. Nor can it be made less abstract without losing its identity,
for the moment the general indictment is given a content-the moment it
has enough specific bite to urge you in some particular direction-it will
have become a scheme of association of exactly the kind it urges us to
escape. In short, insofar as the "crucial" assumption generates a program, it can only be a program of directionless suspicion, a program that
falls under the criticism Unger himself makes of agendas that never advance beyond the stage of negative critique: "freedom to be real, must
exist in lasting forms of life; it cannot merely exhaust itself in temporary
37
acts of context smashing."'
135. Id. at 580.
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If the effects of context smashing are to be more than temporary,
something must be added to the insight that "[n]one of the social and
mental forms within which we habitually move... escapes the quality of
being partial and provisional,"' 138 and immediately after reiterating that
insight Unger moves to provide that something additional: "But these
mental and social worlds nevertheless differ in the degree as well as the
character and severity of their constraining quality."' 3 9 That is to say,
while all social and mental forms constrain our visions and therefore
cause us to be confined within some or other partial perspective, the constraints imposed by some forms are looser than others, and therefore it
behooves us to begin by identifying those forms and inhabiting them so
as to afford the most scope possible to man's "most remarkable quality[,]
...the power to overcome and revise, with time, every social or mental
structure in which he moves."' 140 As that power is increased, it will then
express itself in an "institutional structure, itself self-revising, that would
provide constant occasions to disrupt any fixed structure of power and
14 1
coordination in social life.'
The idea is that you build up a community of enlarged sympathies
by taking advantage of those forms of community whose constraints are
sufficiently loose to permit and even to encourage innovative and context-transcending activity. But as an idea it founders on the very difficulty it proposes to remedy: in order for it to work, there must be a way
of identifying which structures of constraint are looser-less committed
to the limits and norms they declare-than others. Unger, however,
gives us no guidance here. He simply declares that "societies differ
among themselves in the extent to which they lay themselves open to
self-revision" and adds that if we wish evidence of this difference, "it is
enough to compare the liberal democracies themselves to the societies
that preceded them."' 42 But it is not enough, and indeed if it were, if
"schemes of association" were self-evaluating and wore their labels
("conducive to freedom," "tending to the totalitarian") on their faces,
they would not constitute the danger that gives urgency to Unger's project; they would not be compelling forms of idolatry. And since they are
forms of idolatry, that is, forms of belief, they come with their own calibrations of difference in relation to which the "obvious" differences Unger invokes would become matters of contest. That is to say, the
attribution of openness and freedom to one social or mental structure
138.
139.
140.
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142.
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relative to others would itself have to be made from within one of those
structures, and therefore it would not be accepted by someone who was
hearing it from within the assumptions of some other structure. Every
society believes that its forms are calibrated so as to stimulate and nourish freedom, but freedom is a contested concept, and there is no neutral
space in which one can coolly survey societies and decide by which of
them it is best embodied. The point can be made by recalling something
as crude as the ritual comparisons in the American and Soviet media:
the one assures us that Soviet society is closed and permits only a few
activities, while in the United States the possibilities are infinite and we
are (relatively) free to do what we like; the other responds by observing
scornfully that what we are "free" to do is purchase the endless succession of consumer goods produced by a capitalist economy in relation to
which we are all slaves whether we know it or not. The example is, as I
have already said, crude, but the lesson to be drawn from it is generalizable: the extent to which self-revision or anything else is a feature of
some "scheme of association" cannot be determined in the absence of
that universal perspective whose (current) unavailability is Unger's first
thesis.
But there is an even greater difficulty. Not only is it impossible to
determine uncontroversially which of the infinite number of schemes of
association are more open to revision than others; the very notion of
schemes of association that are more or less constraining is itself incoherent. Here we must be careful, for the point is an important and difficult
one. It is important because Unger's project finally rests on a distinction
between two limit-case types of mental and social structures, or, as he
later calls them, "formative contexts."143 Some formative contexts, he
explains, are especially "open to self-revision," 144 and therefore they do
not press their claims with the exclusiveness characteristic of less flexible
contexts. At the other end of the scale, standing as the chief obstacle to
the achieving of maximum openness and plasticity, are contexts that
have become so "entrenched" that they have gained "immunity to challenge and revision in the course of ordinary social activity."1 45 These are
contexts (or schemes of association) whose hold on us has become so
strong that, in the absence of some revolutionary intervention, we will
never be moved to look outside them or go beyond them. The doctrine
of "internal development" 1 4 6 or "destabilization rights" 147 urges us to
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id. at 582-83.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 650.
See id. at 580-81.
Seeid. at 611-15.
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activities that will fragment and weaken the frozen demarcations protected by such contexts, so that they will become less and less the prison
houses of human possibility and more and more the areas in which
human possibility can exercise its capacity for growth.
My response to this urging is to assert that there exist no contexts of
either type, because all contexts are equally (if differently) constraining.
The assertion may seem counterintuitive, but it can perhaps be rendered
less so if we consider one of Unger's concrete recommendations, that we
engage "in the systematic remaking of all direct personal connections...
through their progressive emancipation from a background plan of social
division and hierarchy."1 4 8 As long as such a plan is in force, Unger
explains, people are confined to "fixed roles... according to the position
that they hold within a predetermined set of social or gendered contrasts,"1 49 and he urges us to unfreeze these roles by combining them.
"For example, people may be enabled and encouraged to combine in a
single character qualities that ruling stereotypes assign separately to men
' 50 Now, of course, many
and women."1
people can and have done exactly
that, inspiring articles in the popular press and even motion pictures; and
the result certainly has been a change in the way many men and women
conceive of their roles. But it is not correct, I think, to describe that
change as one in which constraints have been eliminated or even relaxed
in a way that contributes to the freeing of the individual from background plans of division and hierarchy. Rather, the shape of the background plan will have been altered, so that its components-those
assumptions and distinctions that are for the time being unquestioned
and unquestionable-will not be what they were before; but the category
of the (currently) unquestionable will be as firmly in place as it ever was
and will not in any way have been diminished on some absolute scale. In
order to put into question the fixity of the qualities assigned by stereotypes to men and women, innumerable other fixities (the distinction between home and workplace, adult and child, workweek and weekend)
must remain unchallenged; and were they challenged the challenge could
only be intelligible against the background of hierarchies and divisions
that could not themselves be challenged because it would be within them
-that thinking, critical or any other kind, was going on. In short, all contexts have the same (general) shape, a "background plan" made up of
"predetermined... contrasts"1 5 1 and an area of "free" inquiry or "open
texture" that has exactly the extent and content the background plan
148. d at 587.
149. Id
150. Id. at 588.
151. Id. at 587.
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allows. Although the structure is a binary one-settled/unsettled-the
unsettled is itself configured in a dependent relation to the settled. It
follows, then, that no context is looser-more open to revision-than any
other; no context is "naturally" suited to be the starting point on the
road to liberation.
That's the bad news, but the good news (actually the same news) is
that no context is more set-less open to revision-than any other; no
context can gain "immunity" to challenge, because challenge-in the
form of a background plan, parts of which can always be foregroundedis built into what Unger variously calls "schemes of associations" and
"formative contexts." And indeed he himself says as much when he
speaks of the "transformative possibilities built into the very mechanisms
of social stabilization." 1 52 It is just that he thinks these possibilities-the
possibility of turning a critical eye on a previously unexamined
'"given"-can only be tapped by a special reflective attitude that is developed in conscious opposition to routine ways of thinking and acting,
whereas I think that routine ways of thinking and acting can themselves
generate the moments in which their transformative possibilities are
seized.
Consider as a humble but accessible example the following classroom situation. In the midst of a discussion of a poem, a student raises
his hand to offer an observation and is told by a teacher that while his
comment is an interesting one, it isn't literary; it is appropriate to some
other discipline, history, or economics, or anthropology. At this point
the student will have at least two options: he can acquiesce in the instructor's dismissal of his point, or he can challenge the grounds of that
dismissal by questioning the notion of literature by which his observation
has been stigmatized as irrelevant. If he takes the latter course there is
the possibility (not the inevitability) that the "grounding" definitions and
categorical distinctions within which the course had been proceeding will
be changed and that at least in one classroom literature will no longer be
thought of as an activity performed independently of social and political
pressure. Of course, should that possibility be realized, constraints will
not have been eliminated or relaxed, but reconfigured, so that other questions will be regarded as obvious, and other concerns will be known in
advance to be beside the (newly defined) literary point. (There will still
be a background plan, as much in force as ever, but it will not be the
same one.)
But, someone might respond, isn't it the case that change of that
kind or any other will be more or less likely depending on the structure
152. Unger, supra note 4, at 583.
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of the classroom situation? Won't a pedagogical context in which student questions are encouraged and even solicited be more conducive to
reconsiderations of basic assumptions than a context in which the instructor's authority is strongly asserted and there is no regular procedure
for challenging it? In short, aren't some schemes of association more
open to revision than others? The answer to all these questions is no.
The difference between a classroom in which participation is routine and
a classroom in which a student question would constitute an intervention, is not a difference between structures less and more constraining,
but a difference between types of structures of constraint. If in one structure there is a pressure to refrain from speaking, in the other there is a
pressure to refrain from keeping silent. A student who feels that he must
speak (because he knows that silence will be held against him) is not free
relative to the student who feels that speaking carries with it the risk of
disapproval and penalty; both students are directed in their actions by
their understanding of what is and is not an "acceptable" form of behavior in the situation, and the fact that in one situation it is acceptable and
indeed obligatory to speak doesn't mean that participants in that situation are freer than those who, in another situation, are allowed to remain
silent. Indeed, it seems that for many students no situation is more
threatening and intimidating than one in which they are enjoined from
remaining passive. ("Be ye free" is not the command of a liberator.)
The point of the example is not to show that the reconsideration of
basic assumptions is impossible, but to demonstrate both that no particular formative context or scheme of association is "by nature" the site of
reconsideration and that when reconsideration occurs it will not be because a special self-reflective stance-a capacity existing apart from the
capacities inherent in ordinary contexts of practice-will have been assumed, but because someone for some reason (the reasons cannot be cataloged or predicted) has raised a question that an ordinary context of
practice already (implicitly) contains. The power of which Unger continually speaks, the "power of the self eternally to transcend the limited
imaginative and social worlds that it constructs," 153 the power of the
individual "to overcome and revise, with time, every social or mental
structure in which he moves," 154 is not a power exercised in opposition to
the sway of contexts, but a power that contexts make available, a power
whose effect is not to transcend the limits of social and mental structures,
but to redraw the lines of structures that will be no less limiting than they
were before. Rather than being the property of someone characterized
153. Id. at 587.
154. Id. at 585; see supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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by an ability to break contexts, the power of revision is the power contexts confer on someone who can only exercise it in a context-specific
shape. It is not an abstract power, and therefore it cannot be stored in a
reservoir from which one can freely draw. It is not a power that can be
cultivated or summoned up at will (you can't turn it on by throwing a
switch marked "critical reflective capacity") because it does not exist
apart from the particular conditions of its possible emergence. In short,
the context-breaking power is entirely contextual, and rather than transcending contexts its exercise will, at the most, reform (or not reform)
them.
For it to be otherwise, for there to be the possibility that change
could mark an emancipation from background plans rather than the
exchanging of one for another, both selves and contexts would have to be
reimagined in unimaginable ways. And that is in fact how Unger's argument works, by conceiving of selves and contexts as entities with the
capacity of being without content. Selves that are progressively emanicipated from social division, hierarchies, and roles would be selves with no
orientation or angle of habitual vision that included them in this direction rather than that. They would be selves without a core of assumptions in relation to which the shape of things (physical, mental, moral)
came into immediate and unreflective view. The creation of such selves
is the goal of what Unger calls the "system of destabilization rights," the
right to "disrupt those forms of division and hierarchy that.., manage
to achieve stability only by distancing themselves from ...transformative conflicts." 1 55 It is the right perpetually to unsettle and to be unsettled, and were the condition of being unsettled to become more and more
constitutive of the self, the contexts of its activities (such as they might
be) would be correspondingly unsettled, characterized (a word in danger
of being incoherent) by an openness to revision so total that revisability
would be their essence. But of course all of this is a contradiction in
terms. Contexts and selves in perpetual movement can have no stability
of form, and while that is precisely the state of being (or nonbeing) that
Unger desires, it does not correspond to anything that is possible for a
finite creature, for a creature defined by his situatedness. Such a creature
must always be somewhere (in a context) in order to be something (a
self); and if it is never anywhere, if it stands free of all confining hierarchies and roles, it is nothing.
Yet paradoxical though it may seem, nothing is what Unger wants
us all to be, and late in the essay he declares as much when he gives his
155. Unger, supra note 4, at 612.
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program its final and most revealing name, "negative capability."' 15 6
"Negative capability" is defined as "the practical and spiritual, individual
and collective empowerment made possible by the disentrenchment of
formative structures,"' 157 and we can see exactly what that means by recalling the original context of the term in Keats's praise of Shakespeare:
[I]t struck me what quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature and which Shakespeare possessed so enormouslyI mean Negative Capability, that is when man is capable of being in
uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after
fact and reason- Coleridge, for instance, would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude ...
from being incapable of remaining Content
58
with half knowledge.1
In this famous comparison, Coleridge comes off badly because he insists
on being certain, on being firmly placed within a perspective that delivers
stable facts and is intolerant of doubt. Shakespeare, on the other hand, is
capable of entertaining and even multiplying doubts indefinitely and
seems not to feel the need to be grounded by an unshifting structure of
fact and reason. Generations of Shakespeare critics have enlarged on
Keats's observation by saying that what distinguishes the poet is the ability completely to sublimate his own convictions. Whatever position he
may have occupied on a particular matter, he manages to project himself
sympathetically into the positions occupied by his many and varied characters. He therefore seems, continued the critics, to be all of them and
none of them, to be nowhere and everywhere. Or to put it as it has often
(and revealingly) been put, he seems to be not a man, but a God.
I say "revealingly" because the vision (and specter) of God is waiting for us at the end of The Critical Legal Studies Movement just as it
was at the end of Knowledge and Politics.159 You will recall that the
whole point of the essay is to come up with a program that does not
require God to speak its details and direction. The point is underlined
early on when Unger distinguishes between the method of internal development that "pushes by gradual steps toward ever more drastic ways of
reimagining society," and "visionary" insight that "begins with the picture of a reordered human world."' 16 Unger attempts to soften the contrast by claiming that the prophet can only be understood because
something of what he urges "may be discerned already at work in the
anomalies of personal encounter and social practice."' 16 But as I have
156. Id. at 650.
157. Id.
158. Letter from John Keats to George and Thomas Keats (Dec. 22, 1817), reprinted in M.
FORMAN, COLLECTED LETTERs OF JOHN KEATS 71 (4th ed. 1952).

159. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
160. Unger, supra note 4, at 580.
161. Id.
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argued here, any discerning of an anomaly will occur from within some
social practice, and therefore cannot be the beginning of a process by
which social practice is transcended altogether. The distinction between
the internal and the visionary, between something engineered and something revealed, is sharper than Unger wants it to be, and it is only by
blurring it (after having introduced it) that he avoids the realization that
without a revelation-without a God who has spoken-internal development can't get started. If negative capability is the "empowerment made
possible by the disentrenchment of formative structures," 1 62 then it is not
an empowerment of the kind that Unger requires, because the disentrenchment of one formative structure is always simultaneous with the
establishment of another. Whatever "power" the agent acquires he acquires by courtesy of the new structure, and therefore it cannot be a
power by which he is emancipated (even partially) from the sway of
structure altogether. Truly emancipatory power can only be provided by
an agent who is already emancipated, contained and constrained by no
structure, capable of entering and exiting from every structure at will.
It is such an agent that Unger hopes to produce by the bootstrapping agendas he variously calls "deviationist doctrine," "internal development," "institutional reconstruction," "expanded doctrine," and
"destabilization rights." 163 He hopes, that is, to institute conditions that
will promote "the growth of negative capability." 1 6 But negative capability is not something that can grow. Either you have all of it, or you
have none of it. If you are a finite being, and therefore situated, you are
wholly situated, and no part of you or your experience is asituational;
your every capability is positive, a reflection and extension of the system
of belief that bespeaks you and your possibilities, and there is nothing
negative (detached, independent, free) to nurture. And if you are not a
finite being, if you don't believe anything in particular and therefore
don't believe anything at all (since beliefs are by definition particular,
products of partial perspectives, a phrase obviously redundant), but
straddle all beliefs like the colossus Shakespeare's Caesar seemed for a
time to be, you are a god, and growth is beside the point. Despite all his
efforts Unger is unable to provide a traversable middle ground, a space in
which transcendence has not yet arrived but constraints have in part
been relaxed, a space that offers the opportunity of transforming (rather
than merely extending) work, a space of politics, not of politics as "a
disconnected series of trophies with which different factions mark their
162. Id. at 650; see supra note 157 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 122, 146-47, and accompanying text.
164. Unger, supra note 4, at 650.
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victories," 165 but of a politics that "promises to liberate societies from
their blind lurching between protracted stagnation and rare and risky
revolution," 16 6 a politics whose end will make what we know as politics
unnecessary. Simply by calling his project "negative capability" Unger
acknowledges (if only inadvertently) that he is once again at the impasse
he had reached at the end of Knowledge and Politics, unable to chart a
route by which the ideal of universal community can be realized in history and by historical processes. The capability that is required is at once
unimaginable, since our imaginations can only imagine it in their own
form, and unmanufacturable, since to manufacture it you would already
have to be in possession of it and in the place-no place and every
place-to which it was to bring you; it is a capability that can only be
invoked, either forthrightly as Unger does when he cries, "Speak, God,"
or more obliquely by a phrase ("negative capability") that has no possible
realization in everyday life.
The last sentence of The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, like the
last sentence of Knowledge and Politics, is justly famous. Speaking of the
"cold altars" before which the legal academy's shamefaced members insincerely pray, Unger says of himself and his fellows, "we turned away
from those altars, and found the mind's opportunity in the heart's revenge." 167 It would seem that the difference between this confident affirmation and the note of passive supplication on which the earlier book
ends could not be more marked. But the difference blurs and disappears
when we ask: what exactly is the heart's revenge? In Unger's terms, it is
the refusal of the awakened heart to bind itself to the laws of any received
system of authority in order that it might expand to accommodate the
laws that underwrite the universe. But simply to put it that way (a way
fully in harmony with the direction of Unger's thought) is to recall the
context in which the manner of that heart's making is prescribed in 2
Corinthians: "Forasmuchas yee are manifestly declared to be the Epistle
of Christ... , written not with inke but with the spirit of the living God,
168
not in tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the heart."
It is all here, the opposition of external and inefficacious constraints
to the constraints that, because they have been internalized, have joined
the universal and particular. But here also is the insistence that this joining can only be effected by an agency more than human, by the Spirit of
the living God. Only a God can make gods in his image. The heart's
revenge is finally the revenge of human actuality on the aspiration Unger
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id at 582.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 675.
2 Corinthians 3:3.
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is no closer to achieving than he was when he sent up his prayers to a still
silent God.

In offering this critique of Unger, I may appear to fall into one of the
categories he scorns, "people who implicitly deny the transformability of
arrangements whose contingency they also assert." 169 That is, although
I agree with Unger when he asserts that no scheme of association has
conclusive authority, I deny that this insight can in and of itself loosen
the hold of the schemes of association within which we live and move
and have our being (although I do not deny that transformation of those
schemes can be effected in many ways). My reasoning is simple: the
insight that all schemes of association are contingent-rest on a historical rather than a natural authority-does not provide us with a point of
leverage on any particular scheme. All it tells us is that any particular
scheme, no matter how firmly established, has been put in place by political efforts and that in principle political efforts can always dislodge it.
But once that is said, the political efforts still have to be made, and the
assertion that they can be made is not one of them. That is, you don't
challenge the presuppositions of some formative context merely by saying that a challenge is possible. All the work remains to be done, and
until it is done, no currently entrenched scheme of association will even
tremble, much less be shaken to its foundations.
"Arrangements," then, are not transformed simply by realizing that
their transformation is a possibility. The authority of contingent
schemes of association is not shaken simply by an awareness of the contingency. Moreover, contingent authority itself cannot be weakened in
general because particular manifestations of contingent authority have
been challenged and set aside. Contingency itself is never on trial, only
those divisions and hierarchies that follow from the institution of some or
other contingent plan; and when those divisions and hierarchies have
been abandoned or supplanted it will only be because other divisions and
hierarchies, themselves no less contingent, have been instituted in their
place. In short, contingency, the fact that every formative context is revisable, is never overcome, even in part; it is merely given a new form in
the victory (always temporary) of one partial vision over another. Oppositional activity is not transformative in the sense Unger requires; it is
oppositional, a matter of faction warring against faction, interest contending with interest; and when the battle is over, emancipation from the
169. Unger, supra note 4, at 674.
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background plan of firmly entrenched assumptions and categories will
not have been advanced in the slightest degree.
It would seem that in saying this I will have affirmed Unger's
darkest vision, a combination of idolatry and resignation in which the
operations of law and other forms of social regulation and management
are nothing more than "context-specific calculations of effect." 170 In
such a world, Unger complains, "It will always be possible to find, retrospectively, more or less convincing ways to make a set of distinctions, or
failures to distinguish, look credible."' 17 1 That is to say, the distinctions
will only be convincing from within the perspective of some newly victorious context; they will be merely "credible," that is, believable, perspicuous in the light of beliefs; and since beliefs are by definition partial, as
distinctions and convictions they will be illegitimate. This is the logic
that underlies the entire essay and provides its urgency, but I find the
logic incoherent because I can make no sense of the notion of convictions
that do not flow from belief. If I am convinced of something it will be
because within the assumptions that ground my consciousness I cannot
see how it could be otherwise. Independently of such assumptions-or
some angled opening of the world-I would not be a consciousness and
conviction would not be achievable. Moreover, if I am a consciousness
and I do have a conviction, it makes no sense to say it "looks" credible, it
is credible, and there is no better, purer kind of credibility to which my
conviction might be referred for judgment.
What this means is that no one could occupy the position of false
consciousness to which the liberal antinomies have supposedly brought
us; none of us is possessed by convictions in which we do not fully believe
or in relation to which we have a reservation rooted in some higher vision. Despite what Unger claims in Knowledge and Politics, the contradictions in liberal psychology do not describe anyone's "moral
experience"; in no one are the "two halves of the self" at war, with a
despotic reason struggling to control a blind desir6.172 Rather, desire and
reason are always and already joined, for it is from the perspective of
some way of conceiving of the world-some partisan vision complete
with goals and norms and procedures-that one's sense of the reasonable
derives. And since perspectival conceptions of the world are all we
have-for finite creatures perspective is unavoidable-there is no more
abstract form of reason in relation to which one might feel divided. All
of which is to say that one believes what one believes, and therefore one
believes that what one believes is true, correct, reasonable. Of course, the
170. Id. at 566; see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
171. Unger, supra note 4, at 570.
172. R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 55.
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structure of one's belief is always challengeable in ways I have described
elsewhere,17 3 and should the challenge be successful, one will then believe
something else, and it will be in relation to that something else that the
category of "reason" will take shape.
The result will be the history (both personal and institutional) that
Unger disapprovingly characterizes as "an endless series of ad hoe adjustments," a "collection of makeshift apologies," and merely "rhetorical
posturing." 174 But these accusations lose their sting when one realizes
that what they amount to is a complaint that disputes are settled and
problems solved in relation to the norms and urgencies one experiences
in particular contexts, and that since in the course of any practice the
context of concern will be continually changing, the shape and content of
resolution will be changing too. It is only from a point of view
uninvolved in the practice (except as a deliberately distanced observer of
it) that the succession of outcomes will seem inconsistent. To the participants in the disputes and negotiations that lead to the outcomes, there
will be no inconsistency, because the pressures they feel and respond to
are the local pressures of concrete urgencies rather than the abstract
pressure exerted by a demand for transcontextual consistency. Moreover, that abstract pressure cannot properly be exerted on the history of
concrete decisions, because it lacks the content that would render its
judgments relevant. Not that the abstract pressure lacks content altogether. It has the content of the speculative-that is, philosophicaltradition from which it emerges, a tradition in which one of the primary
tasks is to describe the shape and conditions of rationality as they exist
independently of any practice or institution whatsoever. But having deliberately removed itself from the concerns and desiderata of practices
and institutions, it cannot now with justice propose to judge those practices and institutions and find them inadequate. They are inadequate
only with respect to a standard that rejects their urgencies in advance but
itself remains empty, and I think that we are more than justified in rejecting that standard (which has nothing to say except "no") and deciding that for all practical purposes-the only kind of purposes there areit doesn't matter.
When Unger declares that "every thoughtful law student or lawyer
has had the disquieting sense of being able to argue too well ... for too
many conflicting solutions," and concludes that "[b]ecause everything
can be defended, nothing can," 175 he is confusing and conflating two
173. See supra pp. 996-97, notes 143-55, and accompanying text; see also Fish, Change, 86 S.
ATLANTIC Q. 423 (1987).
174. Unger, supra note 4, at 572-73; see supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
175. Unger, supra note 4, at 570.
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wholly disparate contexts of evaluation. In the one, the context of everyday determination, defenses are mounted against a background of presently acknowledged relevancies in relation to which different courses of
possible (in the sense of thinkable) actions will have different significances. In the other, the context of the classroom or the rhetorical exercise, defenses are mounted in response to a demand that one display a
gymnastic skill, the mastery of which is the only relevancy acknowledged. "Everything" can be defended only when the master rule of the
context of relevancy is "defend everything"; but that is never the master
rule in a particular situation, so that the fact that one could perform
gymnastically if that was what was being required does not mean that
one is performing gymnastically in any everyday setting. The same argument disarms Unger's complaint that "[i]t is always possible to find in
actual legal materials radically inconsistent clues about the range of application of each of the models" of legal reasoning.' 7 6 Of course it is
possible, if finding inconsistencies (with respect to no positive vision) is
the game you happen to be in; since the only rule in the game is "find
inconsistencies," it will always be possible to imagine contextual conditions within which they will emerge. But "actual legal materials" are not
the residue of a game in which contextual conditions are imagined; they
are the records of what happened within contextual conditions that the
participants experienced and from which they had no distance; and the
fact that someone else, at a remove, and at a later time, can appropriate
those conditions for philosophical purposes-purposes as special as any
other, and no larger or more general than any other-is simply beside the
point, or, rather, has a point wholly different from the point that made
the materials "legal" in the first place.
This is to say no more than Unger says at the close of Knowledge
andPolitics, and, as usual, he says it better than I could: "the final union
of immanence and transcendence is foreign to the earthly life of which
philosophy speaks." 17 7 The CriticalLegal Studies Movement is an effort
to make philosophy speak and speak intelligibly-with content-of a life
beyond the earthly and so to provide through social engineering what
God withholds so long as he declines to speak. The effort is grand, but it
fails, and at the end of the essay God has not yet spoken. This leaves us
where we were before the essay began, situated in whatever structure of
conviction gives us our world and its indisputable facts, and asserting
those facts with a vigor unqualified by philosophical reservation. If this
is "rhetorical posturing," so be it. It is all we have and all we shall have
176. Id. at 572.
177. R. UNGER, supra note 1, at 294.
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until the perfect and whole shape of Truth returns at "her Master's second coming."

